Key Generation: Foundations and a New Quantum Approach by Yuen, Horace P.
ar
X
iv
:0
90
6.
52
41
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
9 J
un
 20
09
JOURNAL OF SELECTED TOPICS IN QUANTUM ELECTRONICS 1
Key Generation: Foundations and a New
Quantum Approach
Horace P. Yuen
(Invited Paper)
Abstract—The fundamental security and efficiency consider-
ations for fresh key generation will be described. It is shown
that the attacker’s optimal probability of finding the generated
key is an indispensable measure of security and that this
probability limits the possibility of privacy amplification and the
amount of fresh key that can be generated. A new approach to
quantum cryptography to be called KCQ, keyed communication
in quantum noise, is developed on the basis of quantum detection
and communication theory for classical information transmission.
KCQ key generation schemes with coherent states of considerable
energy will be described. The possibility of fresh key generation
is demonstrated for binary and N -ary detection systems under
heterodyne attacks. The security issues of these schemes will be
discussed and compared with BB84. The emphasis throughout is
on concrete finite bit-length protocols.
Index Terms—Quantum cryptography, Key Generation,
Information-theoretic Security
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS paper studies the possible generation of a freshkey between two users via the process of advantage
creation, which is derived from the different ciphertexts or
signal observations by the user and an attacker. The quantum
key distribution (QKD) protocol of BB84 and its variants [1],
[2], [3] are the most well-known examples, although classical
scenarios of key generation were available before [4], [5].
There are various problems in utilizing BB84 type protocols in
concrete realistic applications, most of which can be traced to
the small microscopic signals involved and the need to carry
out estimation of the intrusion level for such protocols.
This paper proposes a new approach to QKD via the
optimal quantum receiver principle for advantage creation:
the structure of a quantum receiver that delivers the optimal
performance depends on knowledge of the signal set [6], [7].
We call this new approach [8] KCQ (keyed communication
in quantum noise) key generation due to the explicit use of
a secret key in the generation process. This KCQ approach
does not exist in a classical world in which a single universal
observation is optimal for all signal sets. The crucial point
of KCQ in contrast to BB84 type QKD protocols is that
intrusion level estimation may be omitted as a consequence of
the optimal quantum receiver principle, which makes possible
among other advantages the use of strong signals. It is hoped
that KCQ would facilitate the adoption of physical key gen-
eration methods in practical optical systems. Note that KCQ
key generation is in principle totally distinct from the quantum
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noise randomized direct encryption protocol AlphaEta (αη) or
Y-00 [8], [9], [10], which is KCQ direct encryption, although
their implementations are closely connected.
A fresh key is, by definition, statistically independent of
other system information the attacker may possess – it has
information theoretic security according to conventional termi-
nology [11]. However, except in the limits of none or all infor-
mation on a bit sequence, it has never been made clear what
operational or empirical meaning and significance the usual
quantitative measures of information theoretic security have
in the context of cryptography. This is clearly an extremely
serious foundational issue and it occurs in all key generation
protocols, classical or quantum. The problem is compounded
by the use of a shared secret key during the process of key
generation which is necessary both in KCQ and in BB84 type
QKD protocols where a “public authentic channel” has to be
created. This paper will exhibit the inadequacies of the usual
entropy or any single-number measure for appropriate security
guarantee. The security issues will be elaborated for realistic
finite protocols.
The case of KCQ qubit key generation will first be presented
due to its close similarity to BB84, which illustrates the issues
involved in a familiar context. The foundational issues of
key generation in general will be discussed, especially those
on proper measure of security as well as the meaning and
possibility of fresh key generation via a shared secret key. The
principles of KCQ key generation follow. The coherent-state
αη key generation scheme is presented next as a different way
of utilizing the αη direct encryption scheme. A generalized
scheme called CPPM will then be described and shown to have
many desirable characteristics of a key generation protocol
under the universal heterodyne attack. Effects of loss and other
aspects of security will be discussed among a comparison with
BB84. Some concluding remarks will be given. The situation
of theoretical security in concrete BB84 type protocols are
discussed in the appendices. We focus throughout on issues
important in the operation of realistic cryptosystems of any
bit length. Note that the new schemes presented are far from
being fully developed and merely constitute the basis of further
development of this new approach of KCQ key generation.
This paper deals with subtle issues of many facets which are
often neither purely mathematical nor intuitive physical, but
of a different conceptual kind [12], [13] that arises from the
nature of cryptology, especially when the crypto mechanism
involves physical principles in addition to purely mathematical
ones. As in some theoretical papers in cryptology, this paper
tends to be wordy and demands careful reading. It is hoped
that the careful formulation described in this paper would
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facilitate further discussions and developments of this subtle,
complicated subject of physical key generation.
II. KCQ QUBIT KEY GENERATION
Consider two users A (Alice) and B (Bob) and an attacker E
(Eve) in a standard 4-state single-photon BB84 cryptosystem,
in which each data bit is represented by one of two possible
bases of a qubit, say the vertical and horizontal states |1〉,
|3〉 and the diagonal states |2〉, |4〉. In standard BB84, the
choice of basis is revealed after Bob makes his measurements,
and the mismatched ones are discarded. It has been suggested
[14] that some advantages obtain when a secret key is used
for basis determination with usual intrusion level estimation
and the resulting protocol is also secure against joint attacks
[15]. Clearly, no key can be generated after subtracting the
basis determination secret key if a fresh key is used for each
qubit. It was proposed in refs. [14], [15] that a long m-
bit secret key is to be used in a longer n-qubit sequence
with repetition. However, even if such use does not affect
the average information that Eve may obtain, it gives rise
to such an unfavorable distribution that security is seriously
compromised. This is because with a probability 1/2, Eve
can guess correctly the basis of a whole block of n/m qubits
by selecting the qubits where the same secret bit is used
repetitively. For a numerical illustration, let n = 103 and
m = 102. Then with a probability 2−15 ∼ 0.3 × 10−4, Eve
can successfully launch an opaque (intercept/resend) attack
that gives full information at the dangerous 15% level [2] on
the total bit sequence while yielding no error to the users. In
general, the strong correlation from such repetitive use would
seriously affect the appropriate quantitative security level, and
the effect of such guessing attacks on some portion of the
data bit-sequence has not been accounted for with or without
privacy amplification included.
This problem is alleviated when a seed key K is first passed
through a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) to yield
a running key Kr that is used for basis determination, as
indicated in Fig. 1. In practice, any standard cipher running
in the stream-cipher mode [16] can be used as a PRNG. Even
a LFSR (linear feedback shift register) is good in the present
situation. A LFSR with openly known (minimal) connection
polynomial and initial state K generates a “pseudo-random”
output with period 2|K| [16]. When a LFSR is used as a
(classical) stream cipher, it is insecure against known-plaintext
attack [16], in which Eve would obtain the seed key from
the running key which is itself obtained from the input data
and the output bits. However, there is no such attack in key
generation where Alice picks his data bits randomly. In an
attack where Eve guesses the key before measurement, the
system is undermined completely with a probability of 2−|K|.
Since it is practically easy to have |K| ∼ 103 or larger in a
stream cipher, such a guessing attack would have a much lower
probability of success compared to, say, the guessing attack
Eve may launch by guessing the message authentication key
used to create the public channel needed in BB84. In contrast
to the case without a PRNG, no subset of the data is vulnerable
to a guessing attack that would correctly obtain a subset of the
key with a high probability.
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Fig. 1. The qb-KCQ scheme. Left – Two bases, I and II. Right – Overall
encryption involves modulation with bases determined by a running key Kr
generated from a seed key K via an encryption mechanism denoted by the
box ENC.
Next, we show that the seed key has complete information-
theoretic security against ciphertext-only attacks. We use
upper case for random variables and lower case for the
specific values they take. Let ρkx be the quantum state
corresponding to data sequence x = x1 · · ·xn and running
key k1 · · · kn. For attacking the seed key K or running key
Kr, the quantum ciphertext reduces to ρk =
∑
x pxρ
k
x where
px is the apriori probability of x. In our KCQ approach,
we grant a full copy of the quantum state to Eve for the
purpose of bounding her information [17]. By an optimal
measurement on the qubits, Eve’s probability of correctly
identifying K may be obtained via ρk. Since each qubit
is modulated by its own corresponding data bit, we have
ρkx = ρ
k1
x1
⊗· · ·⊗ρknxn . For uniform data commonly assumed for
key generation, the Xi are independent, identically distributed
(i.i.d.) Bernoulli random variables with equal probabilities.
Thus each ρki = Ii/2 after averaging over xi for any value
of ki, with resulting ρk =
⊗n
i=1 Ii/2 completely independent
of k. So Eve can obtain no information on Kr or K at all
even if she possesses a full copy of the quantum signal. We
summarize:
Lemma 1: The key K is completely hidden from attack in
the qubit key generation scheme of Fig. 1.
Next, we quantify the minimum security level against
collective attacks on the random data, for which Eve is
assumed to have a full copy of the quantum signal. By
“collective attack” we mean the situation where Eve performs
a constant qubit-by-qubit measurement on her (fictitious) full
copy in the absence of any knowledge on K or Kr, but may
employ collective classical processing of the measurement
results to take into account correlations induced by K . This
is analogous but different from the usual “collective attacks”
in BB84, because there is no question of probe setting in the
present case. Since the term “individual attack” in BB84 does
not include collective classical processing, our use of the
term “collective attack” is appropriate and allows the further
generalization to joint measurements in the most general case
of “joint attacks” [18] . Whatever the terminology, K or Kr
is actually never revealed to Eve so that all her knowledge
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of the data must come from her quantum measurements.
Practically, so long as Eve does not have long-term quantum
memory, she would need to measure the qubits even if she
could obtain Kr at a future time.
Nevertheless, solely for the purpose of lower bounding
Eve’s information which is difficult to estimate otherwise
because of the correlations introduced by K among the qubits,
here we conceptually grant Eve the actual K , and hence Kr,
after she made her measurements. Our KCQ principle of key
generation via optimal quantum receiver performance with
versus without knowledge of Kr is easily seen to work here:
Even with a full copy of the quantum state Eve is bound
to make errors in contrast to the users. Indeed, her optimal
measurement can be found by parametrizing an arbitrary
orthogonal basis which she measures, and optimizing the
parameters assuming that K is later granted to her before she
makes the bit decision. It is readily shown that general POVM
measurements reduce to orthogonal ones in this optimum
binary quantum decision problem on a qubit. Not surprisingly,
her optimal error rate is ∼ 0.15 and is obtained via the
“Breidbart” basis [19] well-known in BB84, for which one
basis vector bisects the angle between |1〉 and |2〉 or |2〉 and
|3〉 depending on the bit assignment, and also in this case by
the basis obtained by rotating the Breidbart basis by π/4.
A key verification phase is to be added in a complete
protocol after error correction and privacy amplification, as
discussed in Section IV B. It does not matter what Eve did in
her interference during the protocol execution as long as the
generated key G is verified. Since her information is bounded
with a full copy of the quantum state already granted to her,
there is no need for intrusion level estimation to ascertain her
information as a function of her disturbance.
The above scheme may be generalized in many obvious
ways. One is to allow M possible bases on the qubit Bloch
sphere. This would increase security without compromising
efficiency as in the BB84 case, because there is no mismatched
qubits to throw away and there is no need to communicate
openly what bases were measured. It is readily shown that
in the limit M → ∞, Eve’s error rate goes to the maximum
value 1/2 for collective attacks [8]. Also, the scheme evidently
works in the same way for Ekert type protocols that involve
shared entangled pairs. Furthermore, the same principle may
be employed for coherent-state systems with considerable
number of photons [8], [20], as discussed in Sections V-VI.
In the present approach, error correction may be carried out
by a forward error correcting code and the resulting perfor-
mance analysis is not burdened by the need to consider Eve’s
probe and whether she may hold it with quantum memory.
If the channel is estimated to have an error rate pc below
15%, advantage is created against collective attacks as shown
above, and the existence of a protocol that yields a net key
generation rate may be carried out asymptotically in the usual
way. This channel error rate estimation is not for advantage
creation because the KCQ principle already guarantees the
users’ advantage over Eve. It is for correcting the users’
channel noise and can be carried out at any time in contrast
to intrusion level estimation. Such a channel characterization
is always needed in any communication line.
In particular, as long as pc is below the threshold ∼ 0.15,
the users could employ an error correcting code with rate R
such that
1− h2(pc) > R > 1− h2(0.15), (1)
where h2(·) is the binary entropy function and 1 − h2(·) is
the capacity of the corresponding (BSC) channel. The second
inequality in (1) ensures that Eve could not get at the data
because the code rate R exceeds her capacity. Under the first
inequality in (1) or a tighter one for concrete codes, the users
can correct the channel errors and generate fresh key at a linear
rate under collective attacks as described in Section III.E.
For concrete protocols there is the general problem of assur-
ing that the side information Eve has on the error correction
and privacy amplification procedures would not allow her to
obtain too much information on the generated key G. Under
the (unrealistic) assumption that only individual classical pro-
cessing of each qubit measurement result is made, which is
the i.i.d. assumption underlying many BB84 security analyses,
Eve’s Renyi entropy, Shannon entropy, and error rate are
simply related. Quantitative results can then be easily stated as
usual. For collective and general attacks there is the problem
of estimating the Renyi entropy for applying the privacy
amplification theorem [21]. With intrusion level estimation in
concrete BB84 protocols this Renyi entropy estimate has never
been carried out, while in Renner’s approach [22], [23] other
entropies are bounded in an unconditional security analysis to
be discussed elsewhere. The problem is much alleviated for
KCQ protocols for which a single quantum copy is already
granted to Eve for quantitatively bounding her information
with no need of intrusion level estimation. In particular, all
the side information from error correction is accounted for by
the second inequality of (1).
The complete key generation protocol, to be called qb-KCQ,
is given schematically as follows:
(i) Alice sends a sequence of n random bits by a sequence
of n qubit product states, each chosen randomly among
two orthogonal bases via a running key Kr generated by
using a PRNG on a seed key K shared by Bob.
(ii) An error control and privacy amplification procedure is
employed by the users to correct their channel errors and
obtain a final generated key G, while assuring , e.g. under
(1), that even after all the associated side information and
a full copy of the quantum state is granted to Eve, errors
remain for her so she has little information on G.
(iii) The users employ key verification as in message authen-
tication to verify that they share the same G.
The above protocol can be easily modified for performing
direct data encryption. Instead of randomly chosen bits, Alice
sends the data out as in (i) with error control coding but no
privacy amplification. The key verification (iii) becomes just
the usual message authentication. Note that this approach is
not possible with BB84 or its secret-key modification in refs
[14], [15], the former because of key sifting, the latter because
of the serious security breach of Eve getting correctly a whole
block of n/m data bits with probability 1/2 described above.
In sum, the specific features of qb-KCQ not obtained in the
corresponding single-photon BB84 key generation are:
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(1) Efficiency is increased in that there are no wasted qubits
and no need for public communication except for key
verification, while security is increased, especially for
large number of possible bases.
(2) No intrusion level estimation is required, thus no false-
alarm problem or any statistical fluctuation problem asso-
ciated with such estimation.
(3) The security/efficiency analysis is unaffected even for a
multi-photon source whose output state is diagonal in the
photon-number representation, as a full copy of the single-
photon state is already granted to Eve for bounding her
information.
(4) The security/efficiency quantification is similarly extended
to realistic lossy situations, while new analysis not yet
performed is otherwise needed to take into account, e.g.,
attacks based on approximate probabilistic cloning [24].
(5) The security/efficiency analysis is also similarly extended
to include any side information for a finite-n protocol,
with no question of holding onto the probes.
(6) There are practical advantages in reducing the number of
random data bits needed by Alice and photon counters
needed by Bob in an experimental implementation.
(7) Direct encryption without going through key generation
first may be employed, which is impossible for BB84.
(8) Sensitivity to device imperfections is reduced in the large
M case.
On the other hand, security analysis of this scheme has not
been extensively studied as in BB84. However, the security
issues of all key generation schemes are subtle as discussed
in detail in the following sections III-IV.
III. FUNDAMENTALS OF KEY GENERATION
This section describes the basic principles underlying all
key generation schemes, classical as well as quantum. The
condition of fresh key generation will be first described using
the conventional entropy or mutual information criterion. The
acute problem of finding operationally meaningful quantitative
security criteria is then discussed in detail. This problem has
not been previously treated in the literature except briefly in
ref [25] but it affects quantum and classical protocols alike.
Indeed the problem is so severe that whenever a shared secret
key is needed for the key generation protocol, it is not clear in
what meaningful security sense a fresh key has been generated.
On the other hand, KCQ, BB84 and its variants, as well as
classical protocols with public discussion all rely on shared
secret key. This issue will be elaborated in section IV after we
describe in this section how a concrete key generation scheme
works in general under the criterion of Eve’s optimal success
probability of finding the generated key.
A. Conditions for Fresh Key Generation
A classical or quantum protocol that generates a key with
information theoretic security would consist of three logical
steps:
1) Advantage Creation
The users A and B create a communication situation
between themselves with input data sequence XAn from
A, an observed random variable Y Bn for B that leads
to a better error performance than that obtained by E
from her observed random variable Y En and all her side
information.
2) Error Correction:
The users agree on a generated string that is free of error
with high probability if E is absent.
3) Privacy Distillation:
The users derive from the generated string a generated
key G on which E’s error probability profile satisfies a
given security level.
The index n above measures the number of channel output
uses. In a quantum protocol, Y Bn and Y En are obtained from
quantum measurements on the quantum signal space accessi-
ble to B and E. The term “advantage distillation” has been used
previously [2] for the situation in which the above advantage
is created by postdetection selection of data by B. That is
one possible way to create advantage classically as described
by Maurer [26] and the Yuen-Kim protocol [27]. Note that a
shared secret key between the users is needed for this approach
with public discussion exactly as in BB84 type protocols, for
message authentication during key generation to thwart man-
in-the-middle attack.
Eve’s conditional probability distribution (CPD) is the prob-
ability distribution of the different possible data values that she
would obtain by processing whatever is in her possession. In
the case of classical continuous signals, say a real-valued ran-
dom vector yEn which E observes, she can obtain from this yEn
the different probabilities pi, i ∈ {1, · · · , N = 2n} ≡ 1−N
for the possible N n-bit data sequences xi that A transmitted
via the signal. Indeed, pi ≡ p(xi|yEn ), which can be computed
from the conditional probability p(yEn |xi) and the data a priori
probability p(xi).
In the quantum case, a measurement has to be first selected
by Eve on her probe or copy with result Y En . The pi’s are
obtained accordingly where now p(yEn |xi) = trΠynρxi where
{Πyn} constitutes the measurement PO(V)M [6], [7] and ρxi
is the xi-dependent state in Eve’s possession. Note that Eve’s
CPD {pi} is indeed conditional not only on all the relevant
system parameters, but also on her specific measurement result
yEn .
In the above privacy distillation step, classical processing is
used by B to distill G from Y Bn . On the other hand, Eve obtains
from Y En an estimate Gˆ of G with a whole CPD {pi} on all its
possible values. The term “privacy amplification” is standard
in the QKD literature when the Shannon or Renyi entropy
criterion is used to measure how well Gˆ approximates G [21].
In Section III.D it will be shown that a necessary criterion
is p1, Eve’s optimal probability of getting Gˆ = G. In either
case and in general, “privacy” cannot be “amplified” but only
distilled or concentrated by processing, exactly as in the case
of quantum entanglement distillation. However, as in the case
of the term “QKD”, we will use “privacy amplification” to
denote the usual privacy distillation procedure and sometimes
even all such, for convenience. Note that steps (ii) and (iii)
are often combined in a single extraction step, as in the case
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of many QKD security proofs, though conceptually and in
concrete implementations they are distinct steps and goals.
We give the usual entropy description of advantage cre-
ation before discussing the more appropriate CPD one. The
situations described by information measures instead of prob-
abilities are often quantitatively meaningful only asymptoti-
cally, except in the all or none limits. Thus we omit the n-
dependence and use XA, YB , YE to denote the data chosen by
A and the observations B and E make. Advantage is created
in entropy terms if and only if the conditional entropies obey
H(XA|YE) < H(XA|YB), or in terms of mutual information
I(XA;YE) < I(XA;YB). (2)
This was first used to propose key generation with the “wiretap
channel” of Wyner [4], later generalized as a general condi-
tion [5] and relaxed by Maurer when (authenticated) public
discussion is included [26]. It may be observed that (2) still
holds in the latter case if YB is taken to be the post-selected
values. Thus, it is appropriate to consider (2) as the advantage
creation (for B vs E) condition when XA, YE , and YB are
appropriately selected from a protocol. It has clear intuitive
meaning and mathematical significance as the condition on
secrecy capacities [5], [26] of the appropriate “channels”.
When a shared secret key K is utilized between A and B for
the key generation, the situation can in general be represented
yBn = E(xAn ,K, r), (3)
where E is the encryption map (including fixed channel on data
transmission) that includes a randomizer r that is not known
to B and may not be even known to A such as when r is some
system noise. Unique decryption means
xAn = D(yBn ,K) (4)
for an openly known function D which would yield the correct
xAn without knowledge of r. We have described the situation of
“randomized encryption” [20], [29] where (4) can be expressed
as
H(XA|YB,K) = 0. (5)
Can a shared secret key K be used between A and B
to generate G with H(G|YE) > H(K)? This inequality
is required for fresh key generation from an “information
theoretic” security point of view so that G is more than just
merely K in another guise. We assume no public discussion
which requires a message authentication part with shared
secret key to complete the protocol. The usual Shannon limit
on data encryption [20], [28], [29], where E is known but the
arguments of (3) are unknown to Eve, is given by
H(XA|YE) ≤ H(K). (6)
Condition (6) says that, given (3)-(5), there is no more
(entropic) uncertainty on XA than the key K itself, assuming
E and D are openly known. Fresh key generation is possible
with cost K only when
I(XA;YE) < I(XA;YBK)−H(K), (7)
which is the same as
H(XA|YE) > H(K) (8)
under (5). In arriving at (7) it is assumed that the key K is
not to be used in any other way so it has to be subtracted
in counting how many fresh key bits are generated. Key
generation is impossible when YE = YB from (6) and (8).
B. Security Measure and p1
Let us consider the issue of security measure on the
generated key G in a key generation system. Eve’s Shan-
non entropy HE(G), or equivalently her mutual information
IE = |G| − HE(G), is the most commonly used measure.
If Eve’s knowledge of G is bit by bit, the binary entropy
of a bit is in one-one correspondence with Eve’s bit error
rate. However, exactly as a many-body problem in physics,
in general Eve has bit-correlated information on G, and we
may ask: What is the concrete security guarantee provided
by having IE ≤ ǫ for a given level ǫ? The problem arises
because IE or HE is a theoretical quantity with no operational
meaning automatically attached. In standard cryptography, this
issue does not arise because fresh key generation is consid-
ered impossible [8], [20], [28], [29]and was never attempted,
while security of other cryptographic functions is based on
computational complexity.
In ordinary communications, the operational significance of
the entropic quantities is given through the Shannon source
and channel coding theorems, which relate them to the em-
pirical quantities of data rate and error rate. But what is the
corresponding empirical security guarantee in cryptography?
This issue was not addressed by Shannon in his classic
cryptography paper written at about the same time as his
classic information and communication theory papers. It was
not addressed by anybody else since, except briefly in [25].
The general situation of security guarantee on a data string
is as follows. The attacker could derive a probability estimate
{pi}, her CPD, on the N = 2n possible n-bit strings as
described in the previous section. This n-bit string could be
the generated key G from a key generation protocol, or the
data XAn in a direct encryption system. If Eve knows nothing
about the string, p1 = p2 = · · · = pN = 2−n which is uniform
randomness. Also, any subset of m bits from the n-string,
1 ≤ m ≤ n, has a probability p(m) = 2−m for her. Thus, Eve
has no information at all on the string.
Any quantitative security measure one adopts must be a
function of {pi}. A one-number numerical function of the
{pi} (that does not encode the whole CPD) may not capture
the different pi values in the CPD in general, other than the
extreme limits of uniform randomness and being nonrandom.
It would express merely a constraint on the possible {pi}. In
particular, Eve’s probability of successfully getting any subset
of the n bits correct is determined by {pi}. The important
point is that one must know that the measure adopted actually
captures the security feature one desires in an empirical
operational sense. In the following and in Appendix A, we
will demonstrate that the entropy measure IE cannot do a good
job in general. In Appendix B we will show the variational
distance δE between Eve’s CPD and the uniform distribution
U is much better but still numerically inadequate. We will
suggest that p1, Eve’s maximum probability, is a necessary
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one-number measure for key generation protocols while still
being far from adequate. It appears that Eve’s total probability
profile to be described later or at least a combination of δE
or IE with p1 is needed for proper security guarantee.
First of all, the CPD and in particular p1 has the same clear
operational significance as probability. For a meaningful secu-
rity guarantee, p1 must be sufficiently small. For a moderate
length |G| ∼ 102− 103, one may argue that p1 ∼ 2−20 is not
small enough for some applications while 2−10 would be a
disastrous breach of security because it is possible the whole
G could be found by Eve with a probability of 0.001. The
natural question on the adequacy of the entropy measure is:
Assuming HE(G) ≥ m, what is the worst possible p1 from
the security viewpoint among the possible {pi} that satisfies
this condition. It turns out that the case where E knows m bits
out of the n exactly is in a sense the best possible security,
not the worst. Note that there is no meaning to average over
the possible CPD under a fixed HE(G) to get an average p1.
One CPD is already fixed by the system and the attack, and
that is the only correct one to use. If only HE(G) is known,
it is not guaranteed that the biggest possible p1 would obtain
with only a small probability.
For fixed p1, the largest HE(G) among all CPD has the
remaining 1−p1 uniformly spread the other N−1 possibilities.
It is given by HE(G) = maxp1 F (p1) with
F (p1) = h2(p1) + (1− p1) log2(2n − 1), (9)
where h2(·) is the binary entropy function. There is no need
to maximize over p1. It is easy to show from (9) the following
Lemma 2:
p1 ≥ 2−l − [ nlog
2
(2n−1) − 1] for IE/n ≤ 2−l.
Since nlog
2
(2n−1) − 1 < 1n2n , it is very small compared
to 2−l for any l ≤ n and moderate n. Thus, we have
p1 ∼ 2−l for IE/n ∼ 2−l. (10)
If a constraint on p1 is first imposed instead, p1 ≤ 2−l, the
smallest IE is given by (10) while the information limit on E
is only a weak guarantee as given by the following
Lemma 3:
HE(G) ≥ l for p1 ≤ 2−l. (11)
Proof: From the (Schur) concavity of H , the minimum
HE under given p1 occurs at p1 = · · · = pm = 2l for
m = 2l, pm+1 = · · · = pN = 0.
Lemma 3 tells the obvious fact that under p1 = 2−l, all
but l bits of G could be completely known to Eve. This does
not suggest that p1 is not a good measure for key generation,
because in a specific problem such as the ones in section II and
section VII, the other pi are either explicitly known or readily
estimated. In particular, it is usually clear that there are many
not totally known bits in G. However, it is also clear that p1
by itself is not generally sufficient and it is useful to have a
bound on IE that would rule out this disastrous possibility.
Generally, if Eve can try m different possible G to break
the cryptosystem, the first m pi are the relevant numbers
to determine any quantitative level of security. For N
possible trials, the trial complexity Ct =
∑N
i=1 i · pi which
is the average number of trials Eve needs to succeed, is a
meaningful measure of security. Note that in this definition
of Ct, Eve already follows the optimal strategy of testing
the more probable sequences first according to the order
p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pN . We have, similar to Lemma 3,
Lemma 4:
Ct ≥ (2l + 1)/2 for p1 ≤ 2−l. (12)
In this connection, it may be pointed out that information
theoretic security could be no better than a complexity measure
if many trials are allowed. In particular, an n-bit uniform
uncertainty can be removed with no worse than 2n possible
trials, or 2n−1 on average.
In Appendix A we will discuss how exponentially small
IE/n of (10) is not a good security guarantee unless l ∼ n =
|G|. For a finite-n concrete cryptosystem, it appears difficult
to approach this experimentally while it may be easier to show
that for p1.
It may be mentioned that p1 is equivalent to the H∞ entropy
often used in statistical analysis. However, its significance
for the characterization of random bits sequences in key
generation has not been spelled out as done in this paper.
C. Uniform ǫ-Random Bit String and Variational Distance
A general security measure on {pi} would include not just
p1 but also the probabilities of various subsets of the bits in
G, which are not determined by p1. Some measure on the
closeness of these probabilities to the uniform U is needed.
To appreciate the importance of such probabilities, consider
the following probability distribution on the n-bit G. One
subsequence, say the first m bits, 1 ≤ m ≤ n , occurs with a
probability p independently of the rest. Assuming the rest is
uniformly distributed, we have for L = 2n−m,
∑
i qi = 1, the
following distribution on the 2n possible values of G:-
pq1, · · · , pqL, 1− p
2n − 2n−m , · · · ,
1− p
2n − 2n−m . (13)
Under the constraint IE/n ≤ p1 for given p1, it follows from
(13) that Eve could determine the first m bits with a probability
p ∼ n
m
p1 (14)
assuming 2n ≫ 2m and p1 ≤ m/n. Equation (14) shows that
a smaller subsequence of G may possibly be determined with
higher probability than the maximum p1 of the whole n-bit
sequence, in linear proportion to its size. Its possible disastrous
effect on security is illustrated numerically in Appendix A.
One useful measure that would yield meaningful bounds on
the subsequence probabilities of G is uniformly ǫ-randomness.
A uniformly ǫ-random n-bit string G is one for which
|pi − 1
N
| ≤ ǫn, N = 2n. (15)
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That is, all the probabilities of the different sequences deviate
from the uniform probability 1/N by at most ǫn. A more
manageable single-number criterion similar to (15) may be
used, the usual variational distance δ(G,U) between G and
the uniformly distributed U ,
δ(G,U) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
|pi − 1
N
|. (16)
It can be readily shown that if δ(G,U) ≤ ǫ, the probability
p of getting any m-bit subsequence correctly is bounded by
p ≤ ǫ + 12m .
D. Privacy Amplification and p1
There is another great significance of p1 on G – it de-
termines the length of a uniformly random string that can
be extracted from G by privacy distillation of any kind.
This is relevant if G is the bit string B has before privacy
distillation instead of the final generated key. For p1 = 2−l, no
distilled key G˜ can be obtained from G which has p1 < 2−l.
This is because distillation is obtained by an openly known
map D : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that maps the n-bit G to an
m(< n) bit G˜. If another secret key is used in this process, its
randomness uncertainty has to be counted also. Privacy cannot
be “amplified”, it can only be concentrated in a shorter key
within the p1 limit. Note, however, that the subset probabilities
p of (13) may be improved by privacy distillation, especially
for m/n small.
In the case of statistically independent bits in G, say
probability p0 > 1/2 for Eve to correctly obtain a bit, p1 = pn0
for an n-bit G. Thus p1 = 2−l for l = λn for p0 ≡ 2−λ, λ < 1.
In this case, privacy amplification on G can be used to produce
even a nearly uniform G˜ with a linear rate λ. In the more
general statistically dependent case, there is no known result
that would guarantee the input entropy per bit of a privacy
amplification code is increased at the output. A different
criterion is used in [22] and will be discussed elsewhere. Note
that the above p1 limitation shows that in general IE cannot
be made small exponentially by privacy amplification beyond
a fixed limit given by (10). The prevalent contrary impression
that there is no such limit is incorrect.
Even within the limit p1 ≤ 2−l, there appears no known
algorithm that would compress an n-bit G with an arbitrary
CPD to an l-bit G˜ with a prescribed near uniform distribution.
Indeed, the mere possibility of such distillation is unknown
and appears to be a useful and promising area of research.
E. Key Generation via IE and p1
We will describe schematically how a key generation
scheme may be obtained under (2) and the p1 criterion. With
the usual “capacity condition” (2), the users can choose a data
transmission rate R that satisfies, similar to (1),
I(XA;YE) < R < I(XA;YB). (17)
If the above XA, YB , YE could be carried out many times in a
statistically independent fashion as in the case of memoryless
channels, a key generation scheme can be specifically obtained
as follows. Alice picks a code with rate R for transmitting the
data that satisfies (17) that B can decode in practice. From the
Shannon channel coding theorem [30], Bob’s error probability
can be made exponentially small in n, the number of channel
uses. From the “Strong Converse” to the Coding Theorem [31],
Eve’s error probability 1− p1 is bounded by
p1 ≤ e−nEs(R), (18)
for an exponent Es(R) that can in principle be evaluated for
given p(XA|YE). For the qb-KCQ scheme of section II, the
exponent Es(R) in (18) for collective attacks can be explic-
itly evaluated and will be presented elsewhere. This Es(R)
gives a linear key generation rate which is nonzero when
R > I(XA;YE). As discussed in the last subsection, hopefully
an n-sequence Y Bn can be compressed to an nEs(R)-sequence
that is nearly uniformly random.
This generalizes to the finite n case without I’s as follows.
Let XAn be sent in a coded/modulated system so that it can be
recovered with sufficiently small error probability via Y Bn . Let
the optimal error 1− p1 that Eve can obtain on XAn satisfies
p1 ≤ 2−l. Then an l-bit G could be generated between A and
B from an algorithm that compresses XAn to a nearly uniform
l-bit string. Since there is no chance for E to encode the data
XAn , a detection theory formulation for her CPD {pi} is more
appropriate than an entropic one. It may yield a more favorable
bound on p1 from the users’ viewpoint than the generally
applicable (18).
As discussed in appendix A, Eve’s p1 actually depends on
the observed yEn . In this section III, we have talked about p1
as if it is unique independent of yEn . While such a situation
may obtain in a protocol such as that of section VI, that
is a rare exception and not a rule. Thus, the p1 of (18) is
actually the average p1 of p1(yEn ) over all the yEn , as is the p1
obtained in the usual classical and quantum detection as well
as communication theory. The use of Markov’s inequality for
a nonnegative-valued random variable may allow such p1 to be
used with a more stringent requirement of p1 < ǫ2 compared
to the original prescription p1 < ǫ. This follows from [32]
Pr[X ≥ δ] ≤ E[X ]/δ (19)
with X being p1(Y En ) that is conditioned on Eve’s observation.
A sufficiently small such averaged p1 is clearly a necessary
condition for security.
IV. KCQ AND KEY GENERATION VIA SECRET KEY
This section first describes the basic issues in key generation
during which a shared secret key is employed. Unfortunately,
a shared secret key is needed in all known key generation
protocols, classical or quantum. The reason for this in BB84
type protocols is that the users need to thwart man-in-the-
middle attack since there is “public” exchange in the protocol.
In this attack, Eve intercepts the communication line and
pretends to be A while exchanging with B to set up the key
agreement, and pretends to be B while exchanging with A.
She intercepts the subsequent communications when A and B
use their generated key, and obtains full information without
being detected. It is not sufficient that A and B authenticate
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themselves outside the times of protocol execution. Eve could
attack only during such times. As in other cryptographic
protocols [16], man-in-the-middle attacks have to be dealt with
by the protocol itself. One way to do that is to employ a shared
secret key for message authentication to detect such attacks
during protocol execution. It has not been treated quantitatively
as part of any QKD protocol thus far. We will show that it is
a serious issue the significance of which is yet to be assessed.
A shared secret key is in some sense used in an even more
essential way in KCQ key generation. We will describe the
schematics of such quantum key generation in a full generic
protocol and the significance of various security assumptions
that can be meaningfully employed.
A. Problem of Key Generation with a Shared Secret Key
The major issue in key generation with a shared secret key
K is that Eve can launch an attack with a guessed value of
K , which will be called the guessing attack. In protocols with
public discussion including all BB84 type protocols, Eve could
guess at K and succeed in breaking the system completely
with p1 = 2−|K|. In a KCQ protocol such as the qubit protocol
of Section II, Eve could make the measurement on the signal
just out of A’s transmitter that corresponds to a chosen value
k. Again she would succeed completely for any n-segment
with a probability p1 = 2−|K|.
This guessing attack may be considered a generalization of
the Shannon limit (6) applicable to both classical and quantum
cryptography. In the quantum case, one may try to get around
it by weakening the meaning of “fresh key generation”. The
BB84 and KCQ approaches may be considered as two very
different ways to deal with this limit.
In view of our treatment in Section III, what could be the
meaning of key generation in this situation with the claim that
its length is greater than the |K| necessary for a fresh key?
The situation remains the same is if one averages p1 over all
possible K values. Indeed, p1 = 2−|K| · 1+ · · · ≥ 2−|K| with
the averaging.
Various qualifications on the security claim can be made
to allow for “fresh key generation” in some sense. However,
it is clear that the n-bit key G (or G˜) generated is not the
same as an ordinary shared secret key from which G cannot
be obtained with probability 2−l for l < |G|. We would
discuss the situation of KCQ in the following. As to BB84
type protocols, it may be observed that depending on how the
exact message authentication method is used in the protocol,
Eve may be able to combine the guessing of a subset of the |K|
bits or some other attack on the message authentication with
her quantum attack and obtain information beyond what is
quantified in the literature. This is the case regardless of what
security measure is used including IE , but does not appear to
have been dealt with in the literature.
Note that p1 and IE together, say in the form of (10) ,
rules out the possibility that the generated key G can be
obtained from classical key expansion [11]. This can also
be guaranteed from p1 obtained via a quantum or classical
meausurement by an attacker on the cryptosystem as discussed
in Section III. It seems a clear meaning on key generation
can only be obtained if one has the total probability profile
which gives Eve’s CPD for the 2|K| different K values under
any specified attack. On the other hand, since the guessing
attack is only good at probability 2−|K|, one may consider
that “satisfactory” for moderate |K| regardless of the length
|G| generated. This would make public exchanged protocol
“secure” and also rule out the correct K guessing attack in
KCQ protocols as relevant.
B. General KCQ Key Generation
Consider an entire joint process of data transmission and
encryption/decryption as described in Fig. 2. A sends an m-
bit sequence Um and encrypt/encode it into an n-qubit or
n-qumode sequence in state ρkx with the possible use of a
shared secret key k with B, which may include a source code
key, a channel code key , and a quantum state modulation
code key. Classically, ρkx would be replaced by just an n-
bit channel input sequence Xn corresponding to the x in ρkx.
The ‘channel’ represents all the interference from the system
one has to suffer, with Chi giving output states for i = E,
B. For E who does not know k, the state is ρ˜Ex upon which
she picks a measurement on the basis of that and her later
knowledge from all sources including public discussion to
produce an estimate Gˆ of G, the final key generated by A
and B. For B who knows k, the channel output state is ρ˜kx
from which she uses her knowledge of k to obtain an estimate
of UˆBm of Um. Classically, the states would be replaced by
the observations Y En and Y Bn , the disturbed output of Xn.
Quantum mechanically, they are the results of measurements
made on the qubits or qumodes from which the estimates UˆBl
are made. One may consider that Y En is obtained without
knowledge of the modulation key. Privacy distillation may
already be incorporated in this process, or may be added to
Ul and UˆBl . The essential steps in the operation of a KCQ key
generation protocol involve
(1) The use of a shared secret key K between A and B
that determines the quantum states generated for the data bit
sequences in a detection/coding scheme between A and B that
gives them a better error performance over E who does not
know K when she makes her quantum measurement;
(2) A way for A and B to extract a fresh key from the above
performance advantage;
(3) A key verification process between A and B.
The main novelty and power of this approach, in principle,
consists of
(a) Performance advantage is derived from the different
quantum receiver performance between B who knows the key
K when she performs her quantum measurement and E who
does not know K when she makes her quantum measurement.
(b) No intrusion level estimation or even intrusion detection
is needed by A or B.
(c) No public discussion is needed between A and B.
(d) No separate privacy distillation, or reduction in the key
generation rate due to any such equivalent operation, is needed
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Fig. 2. General keyed communication in quantum noise.
in a properly designed system.
As a consequence, this approach makes possible the de-
velopment of an efficient key generation protocol over long-
distance telecomm fibers using commercial optical technology.
A final key verification step is needed in KCQ protocols. For
the purpose of assuring the same key is agreed upon for future
use, this step is recommended for all key generation protocols
including BB84. For KCQ protocols, where no intrusion level
estimation is carried out, it is needed to make sure that E has
not messed up the key generation process so that A and B have
different versions of the generated key G. This verification step
can be achieved by any message authentication method [16]
including ones that are not keyed. There can be no man-in-
the-middle attack in KCQ protocols because there is no public
exchange and Eve cannot get G from A without knowing K .
Eve could not tell more about XA other than what she could
find out from her copy. Her disruption may lead to different
versions of XA for A and B, which is to be detected by the
verification step. If she disrupted, but A and B still get the
same agreed key, she does not know anything more about the
generated key anyway, in contrast to protocols that involve
public exchange. Schematically, a complete KCQ protocol
corresponding to the communication situation of Fig. 2 may
be summarized as follows.
Generic KCQ Protocol:
(i) A picks a random bit sequence Um, encodes and mod-
ulates the corresponding n qubits or n qumodes as in Fig. 2,
with a total secret key K shared with B.
(ii) From K , advantage creation is achieved via the different
error performance obtainable by B and E who does and does
not know K at the time of their quantum measurements.
(iii) Privacy distillation may be applied to generate a net key
G on which E has an error probability profile that satisfies the
security goal.
(iv) A and B verify that they agree on a common G.
Note that |K| bits have to be subtracted from the generated key
in the key generation rate. A net fresh key still results in the
situations of sections II, V-VI where a linear key generation is
obtained for a fixed K under constant measurement attacks.
In general, it is part of the performance/security analysis to
ascertain the efficiency of key generation.
C. Security Approaches for KCQ Key Generation
In analyzing the security of KCQ key generation schemes,
we typically grant a full copy of the quantum signal at the
transmitter to Eve for the purpose of bounding the information
and performance she could possibly obtain in any attack. We
did it in Section II on qubit key generation. Realistically, Eve
may or may not be able to obtain such a full copy. In the
process of doing so, say in the qubit case, she may introduce
large errors that would prevent a key from being generated
and such failure would be detected in the key verification step.
On the other hand, for coherent-state signals in the presence
of large transmission loss, she could actually accomplish that
physically with no disruption to the protocol. It does not really
matter which is the case from our security analysis viewpoint,
as we are merely bounding her achievable performance with
this ploy.
A question arises to whether Eve is supposed to know the
shared secret key K at some later time. If she does and she
has sufficient quantum memory, the generated key G would be
completely compromised under the above ploy of granting her
one full copy of the quantum signal. If there is not sufficient
quantum memory, which is surely the case for at least the
intermediate future as no realistic quantum memory of just 1
sec long is even in sight, she would have to make a quantum
measurement before she knows the key. Under such a situation,
key generation is possible unless she launches a key guessing
attack and hits on the correct k value.
It is our contention that there is little reason to worry about
the case where Eve would know K at any time. Having
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a presumably secret key betrayed is an altogether different
problem that occurs in every situation involving such secret.
In the following, we will just use this as an additional ploy
to bound Eve’s performance. As will be seen, its use leads to
a realistically useless bound for binary detection in section V
but still a very strong bound for the N -ary CPPM of Section
VI.
It may be observed that the situation is different with respect
to the message authentication key in BB84 type protocols. If
that key is not known during protocol execution, its knowledge
is useless after the key is generated even with indefinite
quantum memory. But as we remarked, there is no reason
why Eve would know K ever. It may be emphasized in this
connection that there is no known-plaintext attack on the key
in key generation. The data are secretly chosen by A with no
regard to inputs from others.
Other than the guessing attacks, Eve’s optimal quantum joint
attack on the data could be formulated as follows. Let ρkx be
the quantum state for a K-value k and XA value x, thus
ρx =
∑
k pkρ
k
x. The optimal quantum detector that leads to
p1 for Eve is an N -ary digital detection problem, N = 2n.
If the resulting p1 can be upper bounded in the form p1 ≤
2−l, the possibility and meaning of key generation has been
discussed in Section III. Similarly, one may consider individual
or collective constant quantum measurement attacks, in which
a reasonable measurement is chosen for each qubit or qumode
in the signal state space, and find the optimal joint classical
detector performance from such measurement results. They
may be regarded as the correspondents of joint and collective
attacks on BB84. In view of the great empirical difficulty of
measurement across more than one or two modes, the resulting
key generation thereby has clear practical significance. In my
view, its significance is even greater than that of a more general
security analysis that is based on highly idealized model that
never corresponds to reality. Further discussion on such issues
are given in Section VIII.
In the following two sections, we would analyze the per-
formance of coherent-state KCQ systems assuming a fixed
measurement is made on each mode under collective attacks.
Their performance under joint attacks are difficult to obtain
and yet to be derived, but they are of great interest because
these systems can be empirically implemented in a regime
with much higher effective key generation rate than other QKD
systems.
Eve may attack the data via attacking the key first. A
separate key security analysis has to be performed on each
specific KCQ protocol. The key is perfectly secure for the qb-
KCQ scheme of section II, and also for the CPPM scheme of
section VI when p1 is properly adjusted. Additional analysis
on the binary scheme of section V is needed to tell the extent
of modification required for key security.
V. KCQ COHERENT-STATE KEY GENERATION WITH
BINARY DETECTION
In this section we describe the use of KCQ on qumodes,
quantum modes with infinite-dimensional Hilbert state spaces,
for key generation via coherent states of intermediate or large
energy. The use of homodyne/heterodyne detection in quantum
cryptography was suggested in [33], and in conjunction with
coherent states in [34]. In most of the current experimental
developments [2] of QKD, coherent states are employed in
BB84 type protocols that are limited in energy to ∼ 0.1
photon, if only because of the photon-number splitting attack
that E can launch near the transmitter [35], [36]. With KCQ,
we will in this and the next section show that much larger
energy can be employed, line amplifiers and pre-amplifiers can
be used, and conventional optical technology on the sources,
modulators, and detectors can be utilized. Furthermore, direct
encryption coherent-state KCQ in what is called the αη
scheme has already been experimentally demonstrated [9],
[37], which will integrate smoothly with the corresponding
key generation schemes.
The usual description of a single coherent state already
involves an infinite dimensional space, referred to as a qumode.
Similar to the qubit case in Fig. 1, we may consider M
possible coherent states |αl〉 in a single-mode realization,
αl = α0(cos θl + i sin θl), θl =
2πl
M
, l ∈ {1, ...,M ], (20)
where α20 is the energy (photon number) in the state, and 2pilM
is the angle between two neighboring states. In a two-mode
realization, the states are products of two coherent states
|α0 cos θl〉1|α0 sin θl〉2 , θi = 2πl
M
, l ∈ {1, ...,M}, (21)
The qumodes may be those associated with polarization, time,
frequency, or any type of classical mode. Any two opposite
states on the circle form the basis states of a phase reversal
keying (antipodal) signal set, which are nearly orthogonal for
α0 ≥ 3. There are M/2 possible bases. The optimal quantum
phase measurement [7], [38] yields a root-mean-square phase
error ∆θ ∼ 1/α0. Thus, on a bit-by-bit situation, when
M ≫ α0, the probability of error PEb ∼ 1/2 when the basis is
not known which has been confirmed numerically [39], while
PBb ∼ exp(−α20)→ 0 when the basis is known.
The use of this scheme for direct encryption has been
extensively studied theoretically [8], [28], [29], [40] and
experimentally [9], [37], [39]. It is called αη or Y-00 quantum
noise randomized scheme. It can be used for key generation
as follows.
When the key is unknown to Eve, the general quantum
measurement she could make in principle to cover all possible
signal sets is heterodyning or phase measurement on each
qumode. Assuming this (or any other) individual attack, Eve
could determine her whole CPD of p(xAn |yEn ) for the data
n-sequence XAn sent by A with her measurement result yEn
where each yEi , i ∈ 1− n is a complex number. As discussed
in Section IV.B, a whole copy of the signal is to be granted to
Eve for obtaining this CPD for the purpose of security analysis.
The presumably nearly optimal individual measurement for the
αη signal set (20) or (21) for large M is the optimal phase
measurement. The best estimate of xAn from yBn is a classical
N -ary detection problem with N = 2n that would provide
Eve’s best p1 of her CPD. Fresh key generation is possible if
for some n, p1 < 2−|K| assuming it is essentially error-free
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for B, which may be achieved without coding as indicated
above. However, no rigorous result has yet been obtained in
this problem.
On the other hand, that fresh key generation must be
possible under such attacks can be seen from the performance
bound obtained by granting Eve the value of K after the
individual qumode measurements. In that situation, Eve could
use the key value to solve the binary decision problem on
each of the qumodes from each yEi she got. In contrast, B
could use the optimal binary quantum receiver or a close ap-
proximation thereof to determine the data bit of each qumode.
For the discrimination of two equally likely coherent states
{|α0〉, |−α0〉}, the optimum quantum receiver yields an error
rate P¯b that may be compared to the heterodyne result P hetb
and the phase measurement result P phb , with S = α20,
P¯b =
1
4
e−4S , P hetb ∼
1
2
e−S , P phb ∼
1
2
e−2S (22)
Here, S measures the average number of photons received in
the detector and (22) applies in the so-called quantum-limited
detection regime— unity detector quantum efficiency, infinite
detector bandwith, all device noise suppressed. Under (22) and
dropping the factors in front of the exponentials for a numer-
ical estimate of the bit-error rate (BER), which is required to
be ≤ 10−9 per use in a typical communication application, we
have, for S ∼ 10, P¯b ∼ 10−12, P hetb ∼ 10−3, P phb ∼ 10−6. If
the data arrives at a rate of 1 Gbps, the user B is likely to have
109 error-free bits in 1 sec, while E would have ∼ 103 errors
among her 109 bits with the optimum phase measurement.
Presumably, the users can then generate ∼ 103 secure key
bits by eliminating E’s information. Thus, in principle, αη in
its original form is capable of secure key generation against
collective attacks that employs the optimal phase measurement
on each qumode even if Eve knows K afterwards.
There is an N -ary quantum detection problem for finding
Eve’s (averaged) p1 under joint attack, the performance of
which would provide the security level under joint attacks.
The αη key generation scheme in the form (20) or (21)
allows a direct attack on its key by Eve similar to the case of
direct encryption. This problem can be solved by additional
randomization called DSR [8], [40] which we would not go
into here.
It may be mentioned that for binary detection of coherent
states, the optimal quantum receiver performance cannot be
better than that of heterodyning by 6 dB in energy or error
exponent. The antipodal signals of αη lead to exponentially
optimal BER under energy constraint on binary coherent-state
signals, which cannot be improved by bandwidth utilization
[8]. The proofs of these statements will be omitted for brevity.
This leads us to consider N -ary systems in the following.
On the other hand, it should be emphasized that since (22)
provides just a bound, presumably rather weak when Eve does
not know K , there is much value in determining Eve’s p1 in
such cases when the signals are moderately strong in the range
S ∼ 103 − 104 as in the experimental implementation of αη
direct encryption.
VI. KCQ COHERENT-STATE KEY GENERATION WITH
N -ARY DETECTION
The above limitation on the binary detection advantage of an
optimal quantum receiver versus heterodyne can be overcome
in N -ary detection. The use of N -ary systems, in fact, is one
form of coding. As will be seen in the following, it indeed
corresponds to driving the system at a rate between B’s and E’s
mutual information with respect to A as in (17). Amazingly,
for the particular CPPM (Coherent Pulse Position Modulation)
system we now turn, such a rate choice by A can make IE go
to zero with a flat error profile and also with (full) information-
theoretic security against known plaintext attack on the key.
This can be proved against the universal heterodyne attack,
and is possibly true against more general attacks.
An N -ary coherent-state pulse position modulation system
has the following signal set for N possible messages,
|φi〉 = |0〉1 · · · |α0〉i · · · |0〉N , i ∈ {1, ..., N}. (23)
In (23), each |φi〉 is in N qumodes all of which are in the
vacuum state except the ith mode, which is in a coherent
state |α0〉i. The corresponding classical signals are orthogonal
pulse position modulated if each mode is from a different
time segment, but generally the modes can be of any type.
For brevity, we retain the term ‘pulse position’ even through
‘general mode position’ is more appropriate.
The photon counting as well as heterodyne error perfor-
mance of (23) are well known [41]. The block error rate from
direct detection is exponential optimum for large N .
P dire = (1−
1
N
)e−S , P¯e → e−S . (24)
The optimum block error rate P¯e for (23) is known exactly [6],
and given by (24) asymptotically. In contrast, for large N the
heterodyne block error rate P hete approaches 1 exponentially
in n = log2N , which is a general consequence of the
Strong Converse to the Channel Coding Theorem as discussed
in section III.E. For the present Gaussian channel case for
heterodyne receivers, explicit lower bound on the block error
rate P hete , conditioned on any transmitted i, can be obtained
in the form (p. 382 of [30]) that, for any y,
P hete > (1 − [Φ(y)]n)Φ(y −
√
2S), (25)
where Φ is the normalized Gaussian distribution. By choosing
y >
√
2n, (25) yields explicitly P hete → 1 exponentially in
n for any given S. It is a main characteristic of classical
orthogonal or simplex signals in additive white Gaussian noise
that whenever an error is made, it is equally likely to be
decoded by the optimal receiver to any of the N − 1 other
messages [42]. Thus, under the condition P hete → 1, the CPD
has pi = 1/N for i ≥ 2.
The KCQ qumode key generation scheme CPPM works
as follows. Consider N = 2n possible n-bit sequences, and
possible coherent-states
|ψi〉 = ⊗Nj=1|αij〉′j , i, j ∈ 1−N (26)
in correspondence with {|φi〉} of (23). For simplicity, one may
set
∑
j |αij |2 = |α0|2 = S for every i. Let fk be a one-
to-one map between (23) and (26) indexed by a key K . As
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an example of physical realization, the connection between
(23) and (26) could be through a set of N beam-splitters with
transmission coefficients √ηm for complex numbers ηm, m ∈
1−N , determined by k. Such a physical realization combines
the αij of (26) coherently through the ηm’s, and is represented
by a unitary transformation between the two N -tensor product
state spaces ⊗Ni=1Hi and ⊗Ni=1H ′i for the input and the output.
The states |ψi〉 of (26) are used to modulate the data i by A,
and B demodulates by first applying fk to transform it to |φi〉
of (23) and then use direct detection on each of the N modes
Hi.
Without knowing fk or ηm so that there are both amplitude
and phase uncertainties for each m, it is expected that an
attacker can do very little better than heterodyne on all the H ′i
modes, which is equivalent to heterodyne on all the Hi modes,
and then apply the different fk’s on the classical measurement
result. As presented above, by making N large one can then
make not only p1 = 2−l for any l but E’s error profile is
in fact nearly uniform, with p1 = (1 − 2−l)/(N − 1) for
i ≥ 2 . This happens whenever yEn leads to an error from
the decision rule that minimizes the average error [42], which
is asymptotically certain in the situation under consideration.
Thus, if we choose the system parameters so that p1 = pi,
Eve would have uniformly random CPD’s for all yEn and k.
As a consequence, the system is not only completely secure
against ciphertext-only attack on the key but also fully secure
against known-plaintext attacks. There is no need for further
privacy distillation. Also, in contrast to the binary detection
case, the data is secure even if Eve has the key K after her
heterodyne measurement. We summarize:
Against E’s universal heterodyne attack, the N -ary CPPM
KCQ protocol can be made secure with key generation rate
n = log2N per use and uniform CPD to Eve.
However, it is difficult to estimate p1 closely and in the
absence of such estimate, this one case difference among 2n
is either taken to be unimportant or additional DSR is needed
to assure a fully uniform error profile.
The CPPM scheme is also ideal for direct data encryption
because it automatically produces (a near) uniform error pro-
file on E. Unfortunately, as in a classical orthogonal signaling
scheme, large N in CPPM means exponential growth of
bandwidth, not to mention growth in physical complexity.
Indeed, (24) itself is an infinite-bandwidth limit result for large
N . On the other hand, it is known [43] that if the signal-to-
quantum noise per unit bandwidth is small, coherent-state di-
rect detection systems do have larger capacity than heterodyne
ones. Thus, it may be expected that properly designed error
correcting codes, usually employed for bandlimited systems
for such reasons, could be developed to retain much of the
CPPM advantage for a large given bandwidth. I would like to
emphasize again that sections V-VI are sketchy introductions
to some main ideas and possibilities of KCQ key generation
with significant energy coherent states. Many details are yet
to be developed.
VII. COMPARISON WITH BB84
We will briefly compare qualitatively KCQ key generation
with BB84 type protocols which involve intrusion level estima-
tion from a variety of viewpoints. No quantitative comparison
will be attempted due to insufficient quantitative details in both
cases on these issues.
A. Unconditional Security
It is often taken to be true that BB84 type protocols offer
unconditional security in an information-theoretic sense, with
at least asymptotic proofs supplied for the case of ideal
devices. Some problems were raised concerning such proofs
in [8] (App. A) which would not be entered into here. In
any event, as discussed in ref. [28], asymptotic existence
proof has no practical implication in cryptology since one
needs to analyze the security of specific finite-n cryptosystems.
Here, I would like to emphasize that quantitative information
theoretic security of a bit sequence has yet to be made precise
while being operationally significant. As discussed in Sections
III, IV, and the appendices of this paper, the usual mutual
information IE or variational distance δE or their quantum
counterparts employed in the QKD literature is not a sufficient
security guarantee except in an extreme region that appears to
have little hope in ever getting realized practically. Smallness
of the other measure p1, the attacker Eve’s optimal probability
of getting the entire key generated, is a necessary security
feature. Clearly a 0.1% leak of IE is totally unacceptable –
See Appendix A. On the other hand, no KCQ scheme security
under joint attack has yet to be studied.
Actually, as we further substantiate in the following, the
practical significance of such “unconditional security” is over-
rated, both because of intrinsic protocol modeling limitation
and the futuristic technology granted to the attacker. It is not
important to grant Eve the ability to have indefinite quantum
memory while none of one second long is in sight. Similarly,
there is no known experimental way to entangle three or more
qubits or qumodes close to a given prescription. In comparison,
it appears much easier for Eve to just break into a protected
office to get some of the secrets by brute force.
Security under composition is another issue for both KCQ
and BB84 assuming Eve has the required quantum memory.
The purported solution for BB84 in ref. [44] is not valid as
indicated in Appendix B.
B. Device Imperfections
It has been well known that device imperfections could
be exploited by Eve to seriously compromise a BB84 type
protocol. Some seemingly irrelevant imperfections have been
shown to be disastrous, beginning with the spectral defect of
detectors pointed out in [45] to the recent time-shift attack
[46], [47], [48] that have been experimentally demonstrated
[49]. In combination with the inevitable loss of an optical
system, it was recently claimed that no loss more than a factor
of 2 can be tolerated for “loophole free” security [50]. On the
other hand, for KCQ key generation such as αη or CPPM
discussed in sections VI-VII of this paper, there is no such
sensitivity to device imperfection. The intuitive reason is clear:
BB84 type systems operate with a very small signal level and
thus are sensitive to small system parameter variations but
KCQ may operate with much stronger signals.
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C. Sensitivity and Protocol Efficiency
The performance of a key generation scheme for useful real-
life application is gauged not only by its security level, but
also its efficiency in at least two senses to be elaborated in
the following. For a protocol to be useful the two efficiencies
cannot be too low.
The first type of efficiency that should be considered is
protocol efficiency, denoted by Peff , which has not been treated
in the QKD literature. It can be defined as the probability
that the protocol is not aborted for a given channel and a
fixed security level in the absence of an attacker E. It is
essential to consider the robustness of Peff with respect to
channel parameter fluctuation, e.g., how sensitive Peff is to
small changes in channel parameter λc which may denote,
e.g., the independent qubit noise rate of any kind. In practice,
λc is known only approximately for a variety of reasons, and
imperfection in the system can never be entirely eliminated.
If Peff is sensitive to such small changes, the protocol may
be practically useless as it may be aborted almost all the
time. Sensitivity issues are crucial in engineering design, and
there are examples of ‘supersensitive’ ideal system whose
performance drops dramatically in the presence of small im-
perfection. Classical examples include detection in nonwhite
Gaussian noise [51] and image resolution beyond the diffrac-
tion limit [52]. Superposition of ‘macroscopic’ quantum states
is supersensitive to loss [53]. This crucial sensitivity issue is
one of fundamental principle, not mere state of technology. It
has thus far received little attention in the field of quantum
information.
Our qumode KCQ key generation protocols are robust to
channel parameter fluctuations as the case of a conventional
optical communication line. On the other hand, e.g., the
reverse reconciliation protocol in [54], which supposedly can
operate in any loss, is supersensitive in high loss. Let η be
the transmittance so that η ≪ 1 corresponds to the high loss
situation. In the presence of a small additive noise of η/2
photons in the system, the protocol becomes insecure because
the noise induced by the attacker cannot be distinguished from
excess noise. Note that high security level often decreases Peff
and it is important to quantify the tradeoff.
Secondly, even when the scheme is not supersensitive,
the sensitivity level has to be quantified in a QKD scheme
involving intrusion level estimation in a complete protocol
with quantifiable security, for the following reason that has
not been discussed in the literature. A stopping rule for the
protocol has to be adopted to stop the key generation process
after it was aborted for a certain threshold number of times
in a given time interval. If the threshold is set too low, the
protocol may be aborted too often by statistical fluctuation
or un-modeled random disturbance and become inefficient.
If it is indefinitely large, Eve may launch a very strong
attack although it causes much disturbance. In any case, Eve
could raise her possible information by counting on the users’
repeated trials and launch a stronger attack than otherwise.
A complete quantification cannot be obtained without an
explicit stopping rule. Such a rule would affect the quantitative
efficiency of the protocol.
D. Effect of Loss
The usual linear loss is extremely detrimental to quantum
effects [43] and is also difficult to handle in physical cryp-
tosystems. Eve should be presumed to be able to attack much
closer to the transmitter than Bob at the users’ receiver. In
protocols with intrusion level estimation, it is customarily
assumed that Eve could replace the resulting transmission link
with a lossless one, the reason being that she could utilize
free-space lossless links instead of fibers. In KCQ protocols
without intrusion level estimation, Eve may gain a large energy
advantage compared to Bob which has to be exceeded for fresh
key generation.
Even for ideal devices it is not clear what kind of security
proof has been supplied for a purely lossy BB84 system for
what kind of specific protocol. Is the so-called “twirling”
needed for security? Against what kind of channel replacement
attack? We have these questions not just for coherent-state
systems but also single-photon ones, which are not answered
by the decoy state technique [55]. We also have these questions
just according to the usual security measures adopted, not
including p1 or other measures discussed in this paper.
The effect of pure loss and loss plus device imperfections
may be very detrimental [50] and must be fully quantified for
both KCQ and BB84 type protocols with a proper criterion.
Note that coherent or squeezed states of considerable energy
cannot be used in BB84 type protocols to alleviate loss, due
to the signal discrimination attack Eve may launch near the
transmitter. Such attack is thwarted in KCQ protocols by the
shared secret key.
E. System Integration and Implementation
It is difficult to implement BB84 type cryptosystems close to
the protocol prescription due to the high performance devices
required. In contrast, KCQ qumode protocols require only
off-the-shelf optical technology. Furthermore, conventional
amplifiers can be used on them up to a certain number [8], [37]
depending on the system. They can also be readily integrated
with existing optical networks. All of these are difficult with
the weak-signal BB84 type protocols.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Physical cryptography, including KCQ direct encryption as
well as BB84 and KCQ key generation, employs secrecy
protection mechanisms at the physical signal level away from
the bit level at the application layer end of a communication
link. It cannot be attacked from such end and Eve has to
physically intercept the transmission link with sophisticated
technology in order to launch any meaningful attack. This
automatically rules out “petty thefts” and constitutes a sig-
nificant security advantage compared to standard techniques,
similar to digital versus analog wireless rf transmissions. Apart
from the possibility of rigorous security proofs, which has
to be tempered by the corresponding problem of adequate
physical modeling, physical cryptography offers a totally new
way of securing privacy different from all the standard high-
rate cryptographic techniques in use. It is a “new paradigm”
in cryptology.
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A major implication of our KCQ approach to BB84 type
approach is that a PRNG should be used to generate a running
key that determines the users’ choice of basis as described in
Section II. This should be done even when intrusion level
estimation is still employed to retain some BB84 feature for a
weak signal or qubit protocol. There are many resulting advan-
tages both from a practical implementation and a theoretical
security analysis point of view.
The KCQ approach itself seems to hold great promise.
Under universal heterodyne attack, we have shown that in
principle fresh key generation is quite possible in the CPPM
system of Section VI with respect to the attacker’s total
probability profile.
Finally, it is well to recall that we still need to develop a
meaningful and sufficiently strong security measure that can be
usefully estimated and achieved in concrete realistic protocols.
APPENDIX A
INADEQUACY OF EXPONENTIALLY SMALL INFORMATION
FOR EVE
The strongest theoretical security claims (proofs) that have
been offered thus far in QKD is that Eve’s total mutual
information on the n-bit generated key G is exponentially
small in n in various BB84 type protocols. Here we will
show in what ways this claim is insufficient for operationally
meaningful security guarantee. The criterion of vaiational
distance from a uniform string instead of mutual information
is quantitatively similar and discussed in Appendix B. We
are not talking here about the composition problem or issues
of system modeling. It is purely the quantitative security
guarantee within the system model.
Let IE = n − HE(G) be Eve’s total information on the
n-bit generated key G. The well known quantitative claim is
that for large enough n,
IE ≤ 2−λn (27)
for some function λ of the system parameters. This IE is
an average over various random parameters. If we let ri
be the possible values of such parameters with probability
distribution p(ri), the IE in (27) is of the form
IE =
∑
i
p(ri)IE(ri) (28)
where IE is Eve’s information for a given ri. In particular, it is
averaged over Eve’s observations yEn that gives her a specific
conditional probability distribution (CPD) {pi}, pi = p(gi|yEn )
for i ∈ 1−N,N = 2n. Thus, for a given value of average
IE = I0 in (28) satisfying (27), there is at least one but
generally many values of yEn with IE(yn) ≡ I({pi}) =
IE(p(gi|yEn )) that exceeds I0. A reasonable guess would be
that roughly half of the times IE(yn) exceeds its average
value I0. For these values of yn, the constraint (27) would
not apply, i.e., IE(yn) > I0 ≤ 2−n. Without an estimate of
the probability on this set of yn values, the security guarantee
is somewhat shaky.
This point between average versus worst case also occurs
in almost all “computational” problems, say on the average
versus worst case complexity, the latter usually taken to be
the more appropriate measure. For cryptographic security, it
is clear that the worst case also should be considered, as
it typically was in various QKD considerations. Using the
Markov inequality (19) to handle the randomness in IE would
induce a much more stringent requirement IE ≤ 2−2λn than
(27).
Assume IE(yn) satisfies (27), we have seen in Section
III.B that Eve’s maximum probability of getting the whole
G correctly could be as big as p1 ∼ 2−λ(n+logn) from
(10). Also, from (13), Eve’s maximum probability of getting
a fraction 0 < f ≤ 1 of the n bits in G correctly is
p1(f) ∼ 2−λ(n+logn)/f . These are adequately small if λ ∼ 1
for the n-bit G. For λ≪ 1 or even λ ∼ 0.5, it is not clear in
what sense G is close to an n-bit uniformly random string.
The problem is especially acute when G is used to serve as
one-time pad key. At best, it is a λn-bit ‘nearly uniform’
string and calling it an n-bit fresh key is an unwarranted
exaggeration.
What are the possible λ’s one can obtain, in principle as
well as in practice? There are few theoretical papers [56], [57],
[58], [59], [60] that give an explicit expression for λ, none
of which gives it a sufficiently explicit form to tell readily
whether λ ∼ 1 can be achieved with what system parameters.
The situation is a lot worse in practice. The best reported
IE/n appears to be that of ref. [61] for n up to 106 bits
with IE/n ∼ 2−9 ∼ 10−3. Many possible disastrous breaches
of security are not ruled out with such numbers. In addition
to the possibility of Eve’s getting the whole 106 bits G with
p1 ∼ 10−3, from (13) some 10% of G or 105 bits may possibly
be obtained with probability 10p ∼ 10−2, or some 104 bits of
G with probability 100p ∼ 10−1, in addition to 103 bits with
probability 1.
APPENDIX B
PROBLEM OF THE VARIATIONAL DISTANCE SECURITY
MEASURE
In Section III and Appendix A, we showed that Eve’s mutual
information IE is not a good measure of security on an n-
bit string G unless IE/n ∼ 2−λn for a sufficiently large λ.
In addition to IE , the variational distance δE of Eve’s condi-
tional probability distribution (CPD) from the uniform random
variable U with p(ui) = 2−n, i ∈ 1−N,N = 2n, may be
used as security measure. By definition, the variation distance
(or statistical distance or Kolmogorov distance) between two
distributions P and Q over a set N is
δ(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
i∈N
|P (i)−Q(i)|. (29)
We will show that the distance δE = δ(G,U) between Eve’s
CPD and the uniform distribution U also has a problem.
It was suggested that δE is a good measure of security
because δ(P,Q) “can be interpreted as the probability that two
random experiments described by P and Q respectively, are
different” [22], [62] , an interpretation repeated in refs. [44],
[63]. The justification for the interpretation is given by lemma
1 in refs [62], [63] which states that for any two distributions
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P,Q for two random variables X and X ′, there exists a joint
distribution PXX′ that gives P,Q as marginals with
Pr[X 6= X ′] = δ(P,Q). (30)
However, to the extent it makes sense to talk about such
a joint distribution, the interpretation would obtain only if
“there exists” is replaced by “for every”. This is because
since there is no knowledge on such joint distribution, one
cannot assume the most favorable case via “there exists” for
security guarantee or for general interpretation. Indeed, it is
not clear at all what realistic meaning can be given or claimed
for the realization of such a joint distribution, other than the
independent case PXX′ = P ·Q. In such case, even if both P
and Q are the same uniform distribution so that δ(P,Q) = 0,
we have Pr[X 6= X ′] = 1 − 1
N
and the two sides of (30) are
almost as far apart as it could be since both are between 0 and
1. This provides a counter-example to the interpretation.
As a numerical measure, δE suffers the same p1 problem
as IE from the fact that
δE = 2
−l − 1
N
, (31)
when Eve’s CPD has p1 = 2−l, p2 = · · · = 1−2−lN−1 . See Section
III.B and Appendix A. When l is not close to n, the security
risk of a δE guarantee may be tremendous for any n ≫ l
exactly as in the case of the IE guarantee.
However, the subset probability guarantee of δE is better
than that of IE . As stated in section III.C, the incremental
probability from uniform for any m-bit subsequence is no
more than ǫ for δE ≤ ǫ. On the other hand, for ǫ≫ 2−m, the
generated key G is still far from perfect.
In contrast to IE which can be bounded via Holevo’s
inequality, there is no known way to guarantee δE ≤ ǫ for all
possible measurements from Eve. In [23], [44] a strong claim
is made on a quantum quantity d that if d ≤ ǫ the generated
key G is disentangled from Eve’s probe and identical to U
except with probability ǫ. However, the claim was incorrectly
drawn on the basis of (30) in these references. Accordingly,
the universal property of such a key as well as the quantitative
security significance of d do not follow as consequences. These
issues will be discussed in detail in another paper.
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